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Abstract. In this paper, we aim to investigate the superiority and practicability of many-
parameter wavelet and Golay transforms (MPWT and MPGT) from the physical layer 
security (PHY-LS) perspective. We propose novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication 
system (Intelligent-OFDM-TCS), based on many-parameter transforms (MPTs). New system 
uses inverse MPT for modulation at the transmitter and direct MPT for demodulation at the 
receiver. The purpose of employing the MPTs is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless 
transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming communication. Each MPT depends on 
finite set of independent Jacobi parameters (angles), which could be changed independently 
one of another. When parameters are changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too 
taking form of a set known (and unknown) orthogonal (or unitary) wavelet transforms. We 
implement the following performances as bit error rate (BER), symbol error rate (SER), 
peak to average power ratio (PAPR), the Shannon-Wyner secrecy capacity (SWSC) for 
novel Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS. Previous research has shown that the conventional 
OFDM TCS based on discrete Fourier transform (DFT) has unsatisfactory characteristics in 
BER, PARP, SWSC and in anti-eavesdropping communications. We study Intelligent-MPT-
OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of angle parameters of MPT optimized BER, PAPR, 
SWSC, anti-eavesdropping effects. Simulation results show that the proposed Intelligent 
OFDM-TCS have better performances than the conventional OFDM system based on DFT 
against eavesdropping. 
1. Introduction
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) has been widely employed in modern wireless
communications networks. Unfortunately, conventional OFDM signals are vulnerable to malicious
eavesdropping and jamming attacks due to their distinct time and frequency characteristics. The
communication that happens between the two legitimate agents needs to be authorized, authentic and
secured. Hence, in order to design a secured communication, we need a secret key that can be used to
encode the data in order to be prevented from phishing. So, there is a need to generate a secret key with
the existing information available. This key should not be shared as the wireless channel remains
vulnerable to attack. So, the key should be generated by both the communicating legitimate agents.
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms/protocols implemented at upper layers of the open systems
interconnection (OSI) protocol stack, have been widely used to prevent information disclosure to
unauthorized users. However it has its own demerits. To overcome its issues we can use key generation
techniques based on many-parameter wavelet transform 1 22
( , ,..., )n q    (MPWT) and many-
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parameter Golay transform 
1 22
( , ,..., )n q   (MPGT) instead of discrete Fourier transform (DFT) in 
OFDM communications. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective anti-eavesdropping Intelligent 
OFDM system, based on MPT 
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    ( 1 22
( , ,..., )n q    or 1 22
( , ,..., )n q   )  [1]-[2]. 
MPT has the form of the product of the sparse Jacobi rotation matrixes and it describes fast algorithms 
for MPWT. The purposes of employing the MPT: 
 is to study the influence of parameters 1 2, ,..., q   on the transmission performances of OFDM-
TCS, 
 is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming and
anti-eavesdropping communication.
 is to minimize the peak to average power ratio (PAPR), the bit error rate (BER) and symbol
error rate (SER) performances with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on fast
Fourier transform (FFT),
Each MPT 
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    [2]-[13] depends on finite set of independent Krylov-Jacobi (or Euler-
Jacobi) parameters (angles 1 2, ,..., q   ), which could be changed independently one of another. When
parameters are changed, sub-carriers, corresponding to multi-parametric transform, are changed too 
taking form of all known (and unknown) orthogonal sub-carriers that transmit useful information. For 
this reason, the concrete values of parameters 0 0 01 1 2 2, ,..., q q        are specific “key” for entry 
into OFDM-TCS. Vector 1 2( , ,..., )q   of parameters belong to q -D torus space [0,2 )
q . For (2 2 )n n
-MPT 1 22
( , ,..., )n q    q is equal to 
1( 2 )nn  . If, for example, 10n   (
102 1024 ), then the torus
[0,2 )q will have dimension 910 2 5120  (it is not 1-D radio frequency axis in the Fourier analyses!). 
Scanning of the space 5120[0,2 ) for find out the “key” (the concrete values of parameters 
0 0 0
1 1 2 2, ,..., q q        ) is a hard problem. The process of generating a “key” (parameters) of MPT 
can be more efficient in terms of providing security as compared to RSS based technique. This technique 
generates the “key” in periodical manner (known legitimate communication agents) thereby preventing 
the attacker (eavesdropper and jammer).   
Our network model protector consists of a legitimate transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob). 
Suppressor is an adversary attacker (Eve). Eva is always in line of sight of both Alice and Bob. Aim of 
the attackers are to eavesdroppe (Eve) legitimate packets sent between Alice and Bob when required. 
We intend to demonstrate the network performance of Intelligent-OFDM-TCS based on MPT 
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    under eavesdropping attack, which are constituted by Eve. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose effective 1 22
( , ,..., )n q   -based defense
mechanisms to counteract eavesdropping attack in the electronic warfare (EW), in next two sections we 
study Intelligent 
1 22
( , ,..., )n q   -OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of parameters optimized 
PARP, BER, SER, anti-eavesdropping (section 3). 
2. Anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming properties
2.1. The system model 
The system model that is going to be used in this work is know as the wiretap channel model, which 
was introduced by Schannon [14] and Wyner [15]. It is presented in figure 1. This model is composed 
of two legitimate users, named Alice and Bob, while the passive eavesdropper named Eve attempts to 
eavesdrop the information. A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a legitimate 
receiver (Bob), while Eve is trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. We suppose that the eavesdropper 
knows frame of OFDM signal of the legitimate Intel-OFDM-TCS (knows 
0 0 0
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    with initial 
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values of parameters  0 0 01 2, ,..., q    at the time 0t ) and has the capability to demodulate OFDM signals. 
Hence, the legitimate transmitter/receiver (Alice/Bob) and eavesdropper (Eva) use identical parameters 
of Intel-OFDM-TCS which remain constant over several time slots. 
Alice transmits her data using OFDM with N  sub-carriers  
1
0 0
1 0
( | ,..., ) ,
N
k q k
Subc n


 
 
i.e. she use the MPT
0 0 0
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    with fixed parameters 
0 0
1 ,..., q  . When sub-carriers  
1
0 0
1 0
( | ,..., )
N
k q k
Subc n


   (i.e. 
unitary transform 0 0 0
1 22
( , ,..., )n q    of Alice’s and Bob’s Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eva 
this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of radio-electronic eavesdropping attack. 
In this scenario, Bob and Eve will have the same instruments to decode the received message. Therefore, 
the signals received by Bob and Eva are given by A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])1 0 0 0
(B,E| ) 1 22
( , ,..., ) ,
l l l
n q

       
B B B
r s ξ Z ξ  
and then process by  0 0 0
1 22
( , ,..., )n q   -transform 
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])0 0 0 0 0
(B,E| ) 1 2 (B,E| ) 12
( , ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ,
l l l
n q q        
B B B
R r Z Ξ  
where 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 22
( ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ,q n q     Ξ ξ  20 1 1, ,..., 0,N      is thermal noise, which is 
modeled as a discrete–time additive complex white Gaussian process (ACWGNP) with a zero mean and 
2
jam  
variance. This means that Eve intercepts Alice’s message successful. 
 
Figure 1. Eavesdropping attack. 
As an anti-eavesdropping measure Alice and Bob can use the following strategy:  they select new sub-
carriers in Intelligent-OFDM-TCS by changing parameters of 1 0 0 01 22
( , ,..., )n q
   
 
in the periodical (or 
pseudo random) manner (a priory known for Alice and Bob)    0 0 01 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...,rT rT rTq q       
 0 0 01 1 2 2, ,..., ,rT rT rTq q          0,1,2,... r  , where  0 0 01 2, ,..., q  
 
are initial values of 
parameters at the initial time 0t ,  T  is the period of changing parameters. 
If eavesdropping attack is happened on *r -th period ( *r -th time slot) then in next periods *r r  the 
signals received by Bob and Eva are given by A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])1
(B,E| ) 12
( ,..., ) .
l l lrT rT
n q

      
B B B
r s ξ Z ξ  
But they are processed by different MPTs: by MPT ( )
12 2
( ,..., )r rT rTn n q    
(Bob) and by MPT 
( *) * *
12 2
( ,..., )r r T r Tn n q    (Eve), i.e.,  
  
 A A A A A
1
( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(B| ) (B,E| ) 12 2 2 2
( ,..., ) ,
l l l l lr r r r rT rT
n n n n q

 
         
  
B B B B B
R r Z ξ Z ξ Z Ξ  
and 
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 
 
A A A
A A A
1
( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( *) ( *) ( *)
(E| ) (B,E| )2 2 2
1
( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( *) ( ) ( *) ( *, ) * * * *
1 E 12 2 2
( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ,
l l lr r r
n n n
l l lr r r r r r T r T r T r T
n n N n q q

 

    
  
             
B B B
B B B
R r Z ξ
Z ξ Z Ξ Z Ξ  
where 
     
( )
1 12
( ,..., ) ( ,..., )rT rT r rT rTq n q     Ξ ξ , 
* * ( *) * *
1 12
( ,..., ) ( ,..., )r T r T r r T r Tq n q     Ξ ξ , 
A A( [ ]) ( [ ])( *, )
E ,
l lr r
N 
B B
Z Z  
1
( *, ) ( *) ( )
2 2 2
r r r r
n n n

  . 
Both Bob and Eva give the following estimations  
   
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
1B| B|
ˆ ( ,..., ) ,l l l rT rTq       
B B B
Z MLA R MLA Z Ξ
 
   
 
A A A
A
( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) * *
(E| ) (E| ) 1
( [ ])( *, ) * *
12
ˆ ( ,..., )
( ,..., )
l l l r T r T
E q
lr r r T r T
n q
        
  
 
B B B
B
Z MLA R MLA Z Ξ
MLA Z Ξ
   
 
 
using the maximum-likelihood algorithm (MLA). In thermal noiseless case (i.e., 
1( ,..., )
rT rT
qΞ   =0 and 
* *
1( ,..., )
r T r T
qΞ   =0), we have 
A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
B
ˆ ,Al l l   
B B B
Z MLA Z Z  
A A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( *, )
E E 2
ˆ .l l l lr rn       
B B B B
Z MLA Z MLA Z Z  
Bob’s and Eva’s estimations of bit streams are given by the following algorithm  
   
   
A A
A A
( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1
(B,A| ) (B| )
( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1 ( *, )
(E,A| ) (E| ) 2
ˆ ˆ[ ]
ˆ ˆ[ ]
l l l
l lr r l
n
l
l
 
 
   
 
    
 
B B
B B
B CM Z CM MLA Z Ξ
B CM Z CM MLA Z Ξ
 
 
 
and 
   
 
A A
A
( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1
B,A A
( [ ])1 ( *, )
E,A A B2
ˆ [ ] [ ] ,
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] [ ]
l l
lr r
n
l l
l l l
 

    
    
 
B B
B
B CM MLA Z CM Z B
B CM MLA Z B B
 
if noise is missing. We see that Alice&Bob’s anti-eavesdropping measure is successful, since  
   (E,A| ) (B,A| ) (B,A| ) Aˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] & [ ] [ ]l l l l B B B B    
with noise and 
   E,A B,A B,A Aˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] & [ ] [ ] ,l l l l B B B B  
in noiseless case.  
The works by Schannon [14] and by Wyner [15] introduced the concept of “secrecy capacity” as a metric 
for physical layer security. This metric for the thl  time-slot can be formulated as shown in the following 
equation ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A ESec
l l l 
B B (B B
C     where  A B
1
ˆ A (B| )( ; | )
0
ˆInf [ ] [ ] [ ]
sdN
r r
r
l b l b l


 B B   and  
 
A E
1
ˆ A (E| )( ; | )
0
ˆInf [ ] [ ] [ ]  
sdN
r r
r
l b l b l


 B B 
 
stand for the mutual information between the sent message and the 
messages received by Bob and Eve (with noise), respectively. In noiseless case, we have 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],
A Bob A E A E
Sec sl l l dN l   B B B B B BC  
where  
A B A B
ˆ ˆ( ; ) ( ; )
Inf [ ] max Inf [ ]sl dN l B B B B  and  A E
1
ˆ A E( ; )
0
ˆInf [ ] [ ] [ ]
sdN
r r
r
l b l b l


 B B .     
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Generally speaking, this metric allows knowing the amount of information in the received message by 
Bob,  10B B B B Bˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ [ ] [ ],..., [ ],..., [ ]sdNrl b l b l b l B B  coinciding with the amount of information contained 
in the sent by Alice message   10A A A A A[ ] [ ],..., [ ],..., [ ]sdNrl b l b l b l B B .  We will call this measure the “bit 
secrecy capacity” and denote as 
 ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A E
Bit Bit Bit
Sec l l l B B (B BC                                              (1) 
where ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ( ; | )Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A B
Bit l l
B B B B 
 and ˆ ˆ; | ) ; | )Inf [ ] Inf [ ].A E A E
Bit l l
(B B (B B 
 Along with this measure, we 
introduce the “symbol secrecy capacity” 
ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )
[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],
A B A E
Sym Sym Sym
SecC l l l B B (B B                                            (2)                                
where           
1 1
ˆ ˆA (B| ) A (E| )( ; | ) ; | )
0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆInf [ ]   and  Inf [ ] .
s s
A B A E
N N
Sym r r Sym r r
r r
l l l l l l
 
 
    B B (B Bb b b b    
Note, that transmit 
A[ ]lB  and received B E
ˆ ˆ[ ] , [ ]l lB B  messages depend on parameters 1( ,..., )
rT rT
q   
and * *1( ,..., )
r T r T
q   
of the unitary transforms 1 1( ,..., )
rT rT
N q
  
 
and  1 * *1( ,..., )
r T r T
N q
   , respectively: 
A A 1 B B 1
* *
E E 1 1
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ | ( ,..., )] ,   [ ] [ | ( ,..., )] ,
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ | ( ,..., );( ,..., )] ,
rT rT rT rT
q q
rT rT r T r T
q q
l l l l
l l
 

B B B B
B B
   
   
 
Hence, ( | )[ ]Sec lC   and ( | )[ ]
Sym
Sec lC   depend on the same parameters 
* *
( | ) 1 1
* *
ˆ ˆ1 1 1( ; | ) ; | )
| ( ,..., );( ,..., )
Inf | ( ,..., ) Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
A B A E
Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec q q
Bit rT rT Bit rT rT r T r T
q q q
l
l l
   
       B B (B B
C 
 
   
     
 
* *
( | ) 1 1
* *
ˆ ˆ1 1 1( ; | ) ; | )
| ( ,..., );( ,..., )
Inf | ( ,..., ) Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
A B A E
Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec q q
Sym rT rT Sym rT rT r T r T
q q q
l
l l
   
       B B (B B
C 
 
   
     
 
Obviously, in order to have a good quality and secure system it is necessary to maximize the values of
( | )SecC  : 
 
 
1
1
* *
( | ) ( | ) 1 1
( ,..., )
* *
( | ) ( | ) 1 1
( ,..., )
[ ] max | ( ,,..., );( ,..., ,
[ ] max | ( ,,..., );( ,..., .
rT rT
q
rT rT
q
opt Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec Sec q q
opt Sym Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec Sec q q
l l
l l
   
   
C C
C C
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
The secrecy capacities
 
characterize the maximum rate at which message can be securely delivered. In 
noiseless case we have 
A E
A E
* *
ˆ( ) 1 1( ; | )
* *
ˆ( ) 1 1( ; | )
[ ] Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) ,
[ ] Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec s q q
Sym Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec s q q
l dN l
l N l
    
    
B B
B B
C
C


   
   
 
In this case it is necessary to minimize values of  ˆ( ; )Inf :EvaB B l  
 
A E A E
0 1
A E A E
0 1
* *
ˆ ˆ 0 0( ; | ) ( ; | )
( , ,..., )
* *
ˆ ˆ 0 0( ; | ) ( ; | )
( , ,..., )
Inf [ ] min Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) ,
Inf [ ] min Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., )
rT rT rT
q
rT rT rT
q
opt Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
q q
opt Sym Sym rT rT r T r T
q q
l l
l l
   

B B B B
B B B B
   
   
   
    . 
 
It is naturally to introduce normed secrecy capacities 
 
   
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )( | )
( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l][ ]
[ ]
max [ ]
1 [ ] 1 [ ] [ ] [ ],
A B A E
Bit BitBit
Bit Sec
Sec
Bit
s sSec
A B A E A E A B
ll
l
dN dNl
l l l l   
   
     
B B (B BC
C
C
BER BER BER BER
 


   
                 (3) 
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 
   
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )( | )
( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l][ ]
[ ]
max [ ]
1 [ ] 1 [ ] [ ] [ ],
A B A E
Sym SymSym
Sym Sec
Sec
Bit
s sSec
A B A E A E A B
ll
l
N Nl
l l l l   
   
     
B B (B BC
C
C
SER SER SER SER
 


   
                  (4) 
where 
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )
( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l]
[ ] 1 ,   [ ]  1 ,A B A E
Bit Bit
A B A E
s s
l
l l
dN dN
    
B B (B B
BER BER
 
                     (5) 
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )
( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l]
[ ] 1 ,   [ ]  1 ,A B A E
Sym Sym
A B A E
s s
l
l l
N N
    
B B (B B
SER SER
 
                      (6) 
In noiseless case we have 
ˆ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [l]
[ ] [ ] 1 [ ],A E
Bit
Bit Bit
Sec Sec A E
s
l l l
dN

     
(B B
C C BER

                          (7) 
ˆ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [l]
[ ] [ ] 1 [ ],A E
Sym
Sym Sym
Sec Sec A E
s
l l l
N

     
(B B
C C SER

                          (8) 
since 
ˆ ˆ( ; | 0) ( ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [ ] Inf [ ]
1,   [ ] 0   and  1,   [ ] 0.A B A B
Bit Sym
A B A E
s s
l l
l l
dN N
 
      
B B B B
BER SER
 
   
2.2. Simulation Results for MPWT 
In this subsection, we conduct computer simulations to verify the performances of our Intelligent 
OFDM-TCS, based on MPWT 1 2 3 42
( , , , )n     . Simulations have been done in MATLAB 
(R2012b) software. In the simulation, the Intelligent OFDM TCS’s parameters are assumed as follows: 
M-QAM modulation, where 
82 =256M   ( 8d  ), the length of MPWT (i.e., the number of subcarriers 
is 256) is =256N , every time-slot (OFDM-symbols) is a row from grey-level (256 256) -image 
“Lena”, the number of time-slot equal to 256  (i.e., equal to the number of “Lena” rows). The length of 
bit-stream of a single time-slot is equal to 8 256 2048  . Data of 2048  bits are sent in the form of 
256  8-bit symbols (one symbol is of 8 bits).  
Now, we provide some simulation results to substantiate our theoretical claims for MPWT with initial 
values of parameters    0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , / 4, / 4, / 8, / 3 .         If parameters in orthogonal transforms 
of Alice’s and Eva’s OFDM-TCS are the same (i.e., Eve knows  0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , ,    ), then 0MSD , 
0BER  and 0SER . This means that Eve intercepts Alice’s messages successful. In order to protect 
corporate privacy and sensitive client information from the threat of electronic eavesdropping Alice and 
Bob use describe above defense mechanism.  
It would be interesting to know how MSD, BER and SER are changing with respect to deviation 
 1 2 3 4, , ,     from initial values  0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , .      
Example 1. Let Alice’s and Bob’s Intel-OFDM TCS, based on MPWT has the following initial values 
of parameters  0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , , , , .
4 4 8 3
 
  
 
   
     Let Alice’s transmitted message will be as: 
 “The American space agency has released a video describing the perilous journey its InSight probe will make to the surface 
of Mars later this month. Fronted by Rob Manning, the chief engineer at Nasa's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the film 
describes the various stages of what is termed "entry, descent and landing", or EDL. It is a sequence of high jeopardy. The 
agency produced a similar video for its Curiosity Mars lander in 2012 called The 7 Minutes of Terror. That became a viral 
hit. This one isn't quite so showy but is nonetheless very successful in communicating the drama of a landing on Mars. 
Launched from Earth back in May, Insight is still (Friday) a couple of million km from the Red Planet. The arrival time is 
fixed, says Tom Hoffman, InSight project manager at JPL. "We're going to land on November 26 at about 11:47 Pacific 
time (19:47 GMT) regardless of anything. That is, we're on a ballistic entry; we can't change it; we can't go back around," 
he told reporters this week. InSight is a static probe. In other words, it will sit still in one place; it will not rove around the 
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planet like Curiosity and Nasa's other wheeled robots. It will be the first mission to focus its investigations predominantly 
on the interior of Mars.” 
 
 a)                                                                   b) 
 
                                       c)                                                                d) 
 
Figure 2. ( )iMSD   measurement  versus i , where 1 2 3 4 /10            ,           
a) 
0
1 / 4 0,785,    b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785   , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,3927   ,  d) 
0
4 / 3 1,047   .  
If Eve knows these parameters then she will receives the same message. Let now Alice sends this 
message by Intelligent-OFDM TCS with new parameters  1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,
20
 
  
 

         but Eve 
receives it by Intellligent-OFDM TCS with initial parameters  0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , , , , .
4 4 8 3
 
  
 
   
      In this 
case 0,0512BER  and 0,4266SER . It means that almost half ( 42,66% ) of symbols received by 
Eve are erroneous: 
The Fmeri fn  v ce'agenc~ o t telease ' 'vjde•'de d ibnng  he verilot 'journey'it 'InSnwht  soce wjl 'make'to {he turffce of'Ma   
late  {hi 'mnnth. Irnnte  by&Ro 'Manni g,'{hk dhief jnginej ' t'N ta( 'Jet  toqtlsio 'L eos {osz, {he film dj drnbe 'the'varmou 
'st hes'of'wna{ n 'termek'%ent z,  et ent fnd'landinf%, n 'EDM. It'is f teqtjnce'•f nigh'je v rdy. The'aien } wrodu jd'a'simjla 
'vi j• fn 'i{ 'Czri sity'Ma   lande 'in 5 61'called [xd ('Mimu{e  of'Te  os 'Tha{ eedame' 'vm al xjt. [hj '• e isn' 'qtite' n shovz 
eut m 'nnne helet 'verz ttccj  fzl in dommuni a ing {he k am  of& 'landimw •m'M ts.'Latnched'fso  J tto d ck'in'Maz,'In nght'i  
t il  /Ftidaz)' 'couvle nf mill nn k  i nm the'"jd'Plame .'The' trivbl tjme i 'fjxed  ta} 'Tom Xnffman, NnSiwht vroj  {'l naheu et 
IPL. $We'se'wninw'to'land'•  N•uem j &29 et  dott'66:;'  eci m 'time .0>94''WMT. teg tT es 'oe anzthi g. [xbt'is, vd'te'•m 
f dalli  ic en ry;'wd dam'{ chbng 'it; vd dan't h•& ac  frnund,"'he {o d'rjpnr er 'this yejk. InSifht n ' 's a{ic vrobj.'In'other 
yosds, it vill  it's il  in •ne vlacj;'it will nnt'rnuj eround' ie'qlame{'like'Czrio it 'and'Na e't nth t whdeled tobot . It'wjl  ee'th 
'fi tt'mi sion tn iocts nts nnvet igbti•  ' tedolinantl  om {he mnterio '•f'M t . 
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      a)     b) 
      c)        d) 
Figure 3. ( )iBER  measurement versus i , where 1 2 3 4 /10         , 
a) 0
1 / 4 0,785,   b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785   , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,392   , d)
0
4 / 3 1,047   .  
The transmission performances of OFDM system are evaluated by average MSD, BER and SER 
measurements under 256 time-slot.  Figures 2-4 show the average the following measurements 
255 255 2
( [ ]) ( [ ])
0 0 1
1 1 1 ˆ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ,
256 25
|
6
[
s
k k
N
l l
i i k i k i
l l ks
l Z Z
N  
     b bMSD MSD   
255
( | 0) ( | 0)
0
( ) [ | ],A B i A B i
l
l   

BER BER  
255
( | 0) ( | 0)
0
( ) [ | ]A E i A E i
l
l   

SER SER  
versus  
i ( 1,2,3,4)i   in noiseless case. 
It can be seen that when gradually сhanging 1 2 3 4, , ,     the ( )iMSD  , ( )iBER   and ( )iSER 
decreasing to maximum values in about / 4  for ( )iMSD  , ( )iBER   and in about / 8  for ( )iSER 
.When parameters in transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Eva) are the same, we have 0MSD , 0BER  
and 0SER . This means that Eve intercepts Alice’s messages successful. All graphics have V -like 
form. It means, that if Alice and Bob change work value of parameters, but Eve uses previous value, 
then Eve will receive Alice’s message with big mistakes. Theoretical analysis and simulation results 
prove that the proposed new system has better anti-eavesdropping performance than the conventional 
system. 
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                                    a)                                                            b) 
 
                                    c)                                                                      d) 
Figure 4. ( )iSER    measurement  versus  i , where 1 2 3 4 /10         ,    
a) 0
1 / 4 0,785,    b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785   , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,392,   d)
0
4 / 3 1,047   .  
2.3. Simulation Results for MPGT 
In this subsection, we conduct computer simulations to verify the performances of our Intelligent 
OFDM-TCS based on 8-parameter MPGT 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 82 2
( , ,..., ) ( , , , , , , , ).n n n           with initial 
values of parameters    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, , , , , , , / 3, / 4, / 7, / 6, / 4, / 8, / 5, / 2 .                  If Eve knows 
these parameters then she receive the same message. In order to protect corporate privacy and sensitive 
client information from the threat of electronic eavesdropping Alice and Bob use describe above defense 
mechanism. They change parameters    0 0 01 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...,rT rT rTn n       
 
 0 01 1 ,...,rT rTn n      
0,1,2,... r  It would be interesting to know how MSD, BER and SER are changing with respect to 
deviation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, , , , , , ,         from initial values  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, , , , , , , .          
Example 2. Let Alice’s and Bob’s Intel-OFDM TCS, based on MPGT has the following initial values 
of parameters  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, , , , , , , , , , , , , , .
3 4 7 6 4 8 5 2
 
  
 
       
         Let Alice’s transmitted message 
will be as: 
 “The American space agency has released a video describing the perilous journey its InSight probe 
will make to the surface of Mars later this month. Fronted by Rob Manning, the chief engineer at 
Nasa's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the film describes the various stages of what is termed "entry, 
descent and landing", or EDL. It is a sequence of high jeopardy. The agency produced a similar 
video for its Curiosity Mars lander in 2012 called The 7 Minutes of Terror. That became a viral hit. 
This one isn't quite so showy but is nonetheless very successful in communicating the drama of a 
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landing on Mars. Launched from Earth back in May, Insight is still (Friday) a couple of million km 
from the Red Planet. The arrival time is fixed, says Tom Hoffman, InSight project manager at JPL. 
"We're going to land on November 26 at about 11:47 Pacific time (19:47 GMT) regardless of 
anything. That is, we're on a ballistic entry; we can't change it; we can't go back around," he told 
reporters this week. InSight is a static probe. In other words, it will sit still in one place; it will not 
rove around the planet like Curiosity and Nasa's other wheeled robots. It will be the first mission to 
focus its investigations predominantly on the interior of Mars.” 
 
If Eve knows these parameters then she receive the same message. Let now Alice sends this message by 
Intel-OFDM TCS with new parameters  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
10
 
  
 

                 
and Eve receive it by Intel-OFDM TCS with initial parameters.  In this case 0,1827BER  and 
0,8308SER . It means that almost all ( 83,08% ) of symbols received by Eve are erroneous: 
 
“ၔie恐煁jeŵi 灢f灮ܦᅴ恠灡灢eܦffei灢Źܦၨ 灡灢恐ŵejefᅴeၨ 恐灡ܦŶieeၨ ܦၨ eᅴ灢灢i灢i灮ၨ 恐ᅴieܦ恠eŵijၨ e灢ܦjၨ eŵ灮eŹ恐ie灢
ܦY灮ၔiၨ iᅴ恐恠灢ၨ ee恐ၨ i恬恬ܦj灡ၨ e恐eၨ 恐ᅴieܦ灢e灢ffၨ e恐灮fܦ灝灡灢ᅴܦj灡eeŵܦeၨ iᅴܦ灭ၨ ieၨ 眮ܦVŵၨ iᅴee恐灢iܦUၨ 灢ܦ灝f灮ii
灮fZ恐eၨ eܦၨ iief恐e灮ၨ i灮eeŵ恐灡ᅴܦŉ灡灢灡ܦᅴ恐ŊeᅴܦV灢ၨ 恠e恬ᅴi灮i恐恜f灢ၨ 灢灡ᅴ灮灢i本ܦᅴie恐fijj恐eeᅴၨ ŵi灢e灢
ܦᅴၨ eܦŶfŵiၨ ŵᅴ恐灢e灡fe灢恐灮fܦŶၨ 灡e恐iᅴܦᅴe灢灭ee恐灒e灮ᅴ灢i本ܦၨ e灢灢e灮e恐灡iၨ ܦ恬fieiifܥZ恐灮ŵܦUŅŊ眮ܦŉe恐
iᅴܦ灡恐ᅴeŶŵei灢eܦ灮fܦၨ ifi恐jeၨ Ŷf灢eŹ眮ܦၔ eܦfၨ ei灢ŹܦŶŵၨ ee灢eၨ 恐灡ܦᅴi灭ijfŵ恐fiee灮恐f灮ŵܦie灢恐煂ŵŵi灮灢iᅴŹ恐Ŋ灡
灢ᅴܦj灡灮ၨ eŵ恐i灮ܦ煂慀煁煂ܦၨ f恬jee恐ၔie恐ܦܦ灝iieᅴe灢恐ၨ fܦၔe灢ŵ灮ŵ眮恐Uၨ 灡ᅴܦee灢灡灭e恐灡恐fiŵ灡jܦiiᅴY恐ၔii灢
恐ၨ 灮eܦi灢iၨ eܦŶeiᅴeܦᅴၨ 恐ᅴiၨ ၨ i恐eŵe恐iᅴܦ灮ၨ ieeie恬e灢灢ܦŶe灢i恐ᅴŵ灢灢eᅴᅴfejܦii恐灢ၨ 灭灭ŵ灮i灢灡ei灮ၨ 恐ᅴieܦe灢f
灭灡恐ၨ fܦf恐jf灮ၨ iiၨ 恐ၨ 灮ܦ灝f灢灢眮ܦŊ灡eiၨ ieeܦfŵ灮j恐Uf灢eၨ 恐efၨ ၨ 恐ii恐灝fiZܦY灮ᅴiၨ iᅴ恐i灢恐ᅴᅴij恬ܩܦV灢ie灡Źܦܩf恐灢
灮ŵ恠je恐灮f恐ji恬恬iၨ iܦၨ j恐f灢灮灭ܦᅴၨ e恐灒eၨ 恐恐恬f灮eeYܦၔ e恐灡ŵŵiff恬ܦᅴije恐iᅴܦfiၨ eၨ Z恐灢灡Źᅴ恐U灮灭ܦYၨ ff灭灡iZ
恐Y灮ၔiၨ ၨ e恐Ŷŵၨ jeၨ ᅴܦj灡灮fၨ e灢恐fᅴ恐ŊV恜眮ܦ灒ၨ eၨ ŵeܦfၨ i灮f恐eၨ 恐恬fieܦ灮灮ܦŉၨ Ŷej灢e灢ܦܦ ܥ ܦ灡e恐灡e灮
eeܪܦ ܦ ܦŅᅇܦV灡灢ifiၨ 恐ei灭eܦၨ 煁ŉŊᜤܦ ܦVŊUܦܩ灢eၨ 灡ŵၨ jeᅴᅴܦ灮f恐f灮ieၨ i灮f眮ܦUၨ 灡eܦi灢ZܦŶeܦ灢eܦ灮i恐灡恐efjjiᅴᅴi
灢恐eiᅴŵŹᜤ恐ၨ eܦ灢灡iၨ ᅴܦ灢ၨ f灮fe恐iᅴᜤ恐ၨ e恐ၨ f灮ܦe恐ၨ ၨ ܦe灡灢ၨ ܦfŵၨ e灮ၨ Z灒恐ၨ eܦeၨ 恬ၨ ܦŵe恠ၨ 灢ᅴeŵᅴ恐eii灢恐ၨ eeၨ Y恐
Y灮ၔiၨ ၨ ᅴܦi灢恐灡ܦᅴᅴfei灢恐Ŷŵၨ 灢e眮ܦYi恐灮ᅴၨ e灢恐Ŷ灮灢eᅴ本ܦie恐ၨ i恬恬ܦᅴieܦᅴeijjܦii恐灮灮eܦ恠jfၨ eŊ恐iᅴܦŶijj恐i
灮ᅴ恐灢灮Ŷeܦ灡灢灮ŵie恐eie恐恠恬f灮ee恐jiၨ eܦၔe灢i灮灢ieiܦfieܦ灞fᅴ灡ၨ ᅴܦၨ eၨ eŵܦŶieejeၨ ܦ灢ၨ e灮ᅴᅴY恐Yᅴ恐ၨ ij恬ܦ灢
eܦᅴie恐fi灢ᅴᅴܦ灭i灢ᅴiၨ i恐e灮ܦfၨ ၨ ŵᅴܦieᅴܦiifeᅴᅴif灡eiၨ 灮ᅴ恐恠ŵeၨ 灮ji灮fiejiܦ灮i恐ᅴieܦiieeŵi灮ŵ恐ၨ fܦŊ灡灢灢眮” 
 
The transmission performances of OFDM system are evaluated by average MSD, BER and SER 
measurements under 256 time-slot.  Figures 5-7 show the average the following measurements
( )iMSD  , ( )iBER   and ( )iSER   versus  i ( 1,2,3,4)i   in noiseless case. It can be seen that when 
gradually сhanging 1 2 3 4, , ,     the ( )iMSD  , ( )iBER   and ( )iSER   decreasing to maximum 
values in about / 4  for ( )iMSD  , ( )iBER   and in about  / 8  for ( )iSER  . When parameters in 
transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Eva) are the same, we have 0MSD , 0BER  and 0SER . This 
means that Eve intercepts Alice’s message successful. All graphics have V -like form. It means, that if 
Alice and Bob change work value of parameters, but Eve use previous value, then Eve will receive 
Alice’s massage with big mistakes.  
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 a)                                                              b) 
  
                                        c)                                                               d) 
 
Figure 5. ( )iMSD   measurement  versus i , where 1 2 3       4 /10    , 
a) 0
1 / 3 1,05,    b) 
0
2 / 4 0,79   , c) 
0
3 / 7 0,45   ,  d) 
0
4 / 6 0,52   . 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication systems based on many-
parameter transforms (MPTs). The purpose of employing the MPT is to improve:  1) the PHY-LS of 
wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming and anti-eavesdropping communication; 
2) the bit error rate (BER) performance with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS; 3) the peak to 
average power ratio (PAPR). The new systems use inverse MPWT for modulation at the transmitter and 
direct MPWT for demodulation at the receiver. Each MPT depends on finite set of independent 
parameters (angles), which could be changed in dependently of one another. When parameters are 
changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too taking form of a set known (and unknown) 
orthogonal (or unitary) transforms. The main advantage of using MPT in OFDM TCS is that it is a very 
flexible system allowing to construct Intelligent OFDM TCS for electronic warfare (EW). EW consists 
of suppressor (Eve) and protector (Alice and Bob). Suppressor aims to “reduce the effectiveness” of 
enemy forces, including command and control and their use of weapons systems, and targets enemy 
communications and reconnaissance by changing the “quality and speed” of information processes. In 
reverse, EW in defense (Alice&Bob) protects such assets and those of friendly forces.  
A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve 
will be trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. Alice transmits her data using OFDM with N  many-
parameter wavelet sub-carriers  
1
0 0
1 0
( | ,..., ) ,
N
k q k
Subc n


 
 
i.e. she use the unitary transform 
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0 0
1( ,..., )N q   with fixed parameters 
0 0
1 ,..., q  . When sub-carriers  
1
0 0
1 0
( | ,..., )
N
k q k
Subc n


    of Alice’s 
and Bob’s Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eve this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of 
radio-electronic eavesdropping attack.). As an anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming measures, Alice 
and Bob can use the following strategy:  they can select new sub-carriers by changing parameters in 
1( ,..., )N q   
in the periodical (or in pseudo random) manner 
      0 0 0 0 0 01 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,rT rT rT rT rT rTq q q q                 0,1,2,... r  , 
where  0 0 01 2, ,..., q    
are initial values of parameters at the initial time 0t ,  T  is the period of changing 
parameters. Theoretical analysis and simulation results prove that the proposed new system has better 
anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performances than the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on DFT.  
 
 
   
                                    a)                                                                  b) 
 
                                    c)                                                                      d) 
 
Figure 6. ( )iBER   measurement  versus i , where 1 2 3 4 /10         ,      
a) 0
1 / 3 1,05,    b) 
0
2 / 4 0,79   , c) 
0
3 / 7 0,45   ,  d) 
0
4 / 6 0,52   . 
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      a)     b) 
      c)        d) 
Figure 7. ( )iSER  measurement  versus i , where 1 2 3 4 /10         , 
a) 0
1 / 3 1,05,   b) 
0
2 / 4 0,79   , c) 
0
3 / 7 0,45   ,  d) 
0
4 / 6 0,52   . 
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